We explicitly consider strategic interaction between governments to study currency competition and its e¤ects on the circulation of currencies and welfare in a two-country twocurrency search theoretic model. Each government …nances public goods by means of seigniorage. Compared with a regime with two local currencies, a regime with one international currency allows the issuer of the international currency to reduce the in ‡ation tax while collecting more seigniorage, and forces the other issuer to raise the rate to compensate for a diminished tax base. However, the country with a local currency is sometimes constrained by an in ‡ation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline.
Introduction
Monies, either minted or printed, have long been used to provide economies with means of payment and to generate revenues for governments to …nance public spending. These two functions of money issuance are interrelated with each other. If a government is a sole issuer of currency, it is easier for it to collect seigniorage at the expense of providing a "stable" means of payment than otherwise. In the …fteenth century, for example, the Yuan dynasty enjoyed the monopoly power of issuing paper money in China, paying little attention to the control of in ‡ation, until its economic and military power declined. On the other hand, if multiple states issue monies, competition for wider circulation imposes an in ‡ation discipline. In the seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy pursued a policy of "price discrimination" among its own Castillian currencies: it faced competition from other states minting large-denomination coins, forcing it not to seek additional short-term revenue, while petty coinage was a local monopoly, allowing the Monarchy to collect a good amount of seigniorage (Motomura, 1994) .
Even now, many developing countries still heavily rely on seigniorage revenue. They would raise the in ‡ation rates to collect seigniorage had there been no currency competition. In the presence of international currencies such as US dollar, however, too high an in ‡ation rate may lead to the domestic circulation of the international currency, which deteriorates the tax base of seigniorage.
This concern induces an in ‡ation discipline on these countries. 1 The purpose of this paper is to construct a model of multiple currencies as media of exchange that systematically accounts for these observations. More speci…cally, this paper studies currency competition between governments and its effects on the circulation of currencies and welfare levels in a two-country, two-currency search theoretic model due to Matsuyama et al. (1993) . 2 Each country consists of in…nitely-lived pri-1 According to the estimates by Gordon and Li (2005) , seigniorage averaged about 10.3 percent of revenues collected in the developing countries, and 1 percent in the developed countries between 1996 and 2001. At the same time, in ‡ation rate is averaged about 8.1 percent in the developing countries, and 2.4 percent in the developed countries. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006) …nd that trade openness and …nancial integration have a negative impact on the tax base of the so-called "easy to collect" taxes such as seigniorage and tari¤ in the developing countries between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.
2 There are preceding works using search-theoretic models to study the issues of international currency. Zhou (1997) considers preference shocks to induce currency exchange in a framework similar to Matsuyama et al. (1993) . Wright and Trejos (2001) consider a search model with divisible goods to study the determination of exchange rate.
vate agents and a government. A representative agent obtains utility from private good and the public good of his own country. Each government prints …at money, taxes on money holdings, and uses seigniorage to purchase private goods and provide public goods. Agents interact with home and foreign agents with di¤erent frequencies, re ‡ecting the relative country size and the degree of international economic integration. Agents choose which money to hold to conduct trade. In so doing, they take into account the relative frequency of trade, which may di¤er across currencies, and the risk of con…scation (a proxy for in ‡ation) that each currency is subject to. 3 We …rst study the e¤ects of in ‡ation taxes on the circulation of currencies. If the degree of economic integration is su¢ ciently low, there exists an equilibrium where the two national currencies circulate only locally. We call this situation autarky. The higher the degree of economic integration becomes, the more likely is one of the currencies to circulate internationally.
In particular, the larger country is more likely to have its currency circulate internationally than the smaller country. We …nd that the higher the in ‡ation rate on a given currency is, the less likely is it to circulate locally and internationally. More speci…cally, the greater the foreign in ‡ation tax is relative to home in ‡ation tax, the more attractive home currency becomes relative to foreign currency and, therefore, the higher incentive agents have to use home currency. A su¢ ciently high in ‡ation tax eliminates its chance of domestic circulation as well as worldwide circulation. The negative impact of a country's in ‡ationary policy on the circulation of its currency imposes an in ‡ation discipline. This is one of the issues that cannot be analyzed in a framework with no endogenous emergence of an international currency. 4 Trejos (2003) conducts numerical simulations on a policy game with seigniorage maximization as the objective of governments, in the model of Wright and Trejos (2001) . Curtis and Waller (2003) show how currency restrictions and government transactions policy a¤ect the values of …at currencies in a two-country model. Ravikumar and Wallace (2002) show that a uniform currency can eliminate inferior equilibria associated with distinct currencies, while Kiyotaki and Moore (2003) provide a model in which a uni…ed currency can lead to too little specialization. 3 Previous studies on how trade frictions and government policy in ‡uence the circulation and value of a medium of exchange include Li (1995) , Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and Li and Wright (1998) . In Li (1995) the government taxing …at money holding increases the risk (cost) of holding money, which we adopt here as the proxy for in ‡ation. 4 This paper is also related to the studies on currency competition and tax competition. For example, Martin and Schreft (2006) consider competition among privately issued monies in a search-theoretic model, whereas both currencies in the current paper are …at currencies. Canzoneri and Diba (1992) use a money-in-the-utility-function model to show that (exogenously-determined) currency substitution provides an in ‡ation discipline, while the acceptance of currencies is endogenously determined in this paper. Wilson (1986) shows that the interregional tax
We then consider strategic interaction between governments, which is the main contribution of the present paper that goes beyond, among others, Matsuyama et al. (1993) and Wright and Trejos (2001) . We …rst study a situation in which all the agents and the governments believe a particular equilibrium to prevail, and the two governments choose tax rates simultaneously, measuring the payo¤ of each government by the utility of its own representative agent. Two opposing forces a¤ect the optimal in ‡ation rate chosen by the country that issues the international currency: the enlarged tax base, and the tax burden that falls partially on foreigners. If the former e¤ect dominates the latter, we observe a lower in ‡ation rate on a currency circulating abroad than under autarky. The country with the local currency, on the contrary, has an incentive to raise the in ‡ation rate to collect seigniorage, because the tax base shrinks due to the use of foreign currency. However, the possibility of abandoning the use of home currency provides a force to curb the in ‡ation tendency. The force is stronger as the degree of "openness" facing the country is higher, since this increases the gains of using foreign currency. 5
A country that successfully has its currency circulate abroad will enjoy higher welfare than under autarky: both the amount of public good and private consumption are higher, since it can collect seigniorage from foreigners, and the trade opportunities expand. Whether the other country bene…ts from the circulation of foreign currency depends on the positive e¤ect of an increase in trade opportunity and the negative e¤ect of losing the tax base. If the degree of "openness" facing the country is su¢ ciently small, using foreign currency is not bene…cial because the seigniorage is partially taken away, while there is little bene…t from trade.
We also consider the situation where both governments choose in ‡ation tax rates, understanding the possibility that their choices a¤ect which equilibrium to prevail. One of the key …ndings is as follows. If the governments act strategically in selecting equilibrium, the larger country would try to lower the in ‡ation rate to make its currency circulate internationally. The other country, knowing this, may lower the in ‡ation rate to maintain its national currency as competition on capital may results in a too low tax rate (i.e., too high level of capital to produce public goods). In our paper similar incentives drive a government to adopt a too high in ‡ation rate to raise the seigniorage, which is used to provide public goods. 5 Romer (1993) …nds negative correlation between openness and in ‡ation and argues that the absence of precommitment in monetary policy leading to excessive in ‡ation is the underlying mechanism. Here we provide another mechanism: the negative impact of a country's in ‡ationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency imposes an in ‡ation discipline, and the higher the degree of openness is, the stronger is the discipline.
the sole medium of exchange to prevent the tax base from diminishing. As a result, it would raise less seigniorage than when there was no such strategic interaction. We also ask, will a government raise the in ‡ation rate after it has successfully made its national currency circulate abroad? This time-inconsistency problem is not likely to arise if the "degree of openness" is su¢ ciently high, since in this case, the government can make the currency attractive enough to foreigners without lowering the in ‡ation rate too much in the …rst place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 discusses the existence and properties of various types of equilibria under in ‡ation tax policy.
Section 4 studies currency competition between governments and its e¤ects on welfare. In section 5 we discuss strategic selection of equilibrium. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for possible modi…cations and extensions.
The Basic Model
Time is discrete and the horizon is in…nite. There is a 
Agents are matched randomly in pairs, but not in a uniform fashion. Agents who live in di¤erent countries meet less frequently than a pair of agents who live in the same country. Let 2 (0; 1): A Home agent meets another Home agent with probability n, and meets a Foreign agent with probability (1 n): A Foreign agent meets a Home and another Foreign agent with probability n and (1 n); respectively. Note that the above description implies the probability of meeting a trade partner also depends on the size of country. We can interpret as the degree of economic integration or a measure of the trading frictions in international trade. An increase in reduces international trade frictions, because higher makes it easier to meet with foreign citizens. Similarly, a higher n not only makes it easier for the Home agents to meet with their fellow citizens but also makes it easier for a Foreign agent to trade with Home agents.
Trade entails a one-for-one swap of inventories, and takes place if and only if both agents agree to trade. The trade partner's type and inventory are observable, trade histories are not.
Agents are unable to commit to future actions, and proposed transfers cannot be enforced.
Thus, people trade when there is a single coincidence of wants, and all trades involve the use of a tangible medium of exchange.
The role of governments in the provision of public goods
In each country there is a government whose role is to print …at money, tax money holdings and provide public goods from the private goods that it purchases. An agent who holds Home (resp. Foreign) currency is subject to a probability h (resp. f ) that his money would be con…scated by the government of Home (resp. Foreign) country. We interpret h (resp. f ) as an in ‡ation tax. 6
6 One may wonder why we use the present formulation for tax scheme instead of Li's (1995) formulation.
Indeed, it is more naturally interpreted as a consumption tax rather than an in ‡ation tax. In an ex ante sense, however, it may well be interpreted as an in ‡ation tax. The reason is twofold. First, since each agent has no incentive to defer the timing of consumption, the di¤erence between an in ‡ation tax and a consumption tax does not induce any di¤erence in terms of decision making of the agent. Second, since each agent is risk neutral, these two taxes do not cause di¤erent e¤ects in terms of expected payo¤ if properly translated. The main merit of the setup of the current version is its tractability. Indeed, in an earlier version of the paper we modeled the in ‡ation tax as in Li (1995) , but it turned out to be non-tractable to obtain closed form solutions in various attempts.
When a Home currency holder and a commodity holder are matched and about to trade, a Home government agent steps in with probability h , con…scating money from the money holder and purchasing the commodity from the commodity holder. The same arrangement is made for Foreign government. In this series of moves, the money holder loses what he had without obtaining his consumption good and goes back to the status of holding commodity, the commodity holder becomes money holder just like when he trades with the private agent, and the government obtains the commodity.
Home (resp. Foreign) government transforms the private goods it purchases into public goods from which every private agent in Home (resp. Foreign) country enjoys the utility of n (G) (resp.
(1 n) (G )) where G (resp. G ) is the total quantity of private goods purchased by Home (resp. Foreign) government in a unit of time. We assume
Public goods are nonstorable (e.g., administrative service). 7
Strategies and equilibria
An agent chooses trade strategies to maximize his expected discounted utility, taking as given others' strategies and the distribution of inventories. We restrict our attention to pure strategies which only depend on his nationality and the objects he and his trading partner have in inventory. Thus, the Home agent's trade strategy can be described as
1 if he trades object a for b 0 otherwise, where a; b = g; h; or f; and a 6 = b: Similarly, the Foreign agent's trade strategy is given by s ab = 0 or 1. We consider only time-independent strategies. Given that the physical environment is stationary and the planning horizon is in…nite, we can therefore con…ne our attention to steadystate equilibrium.
Let V g ; V h and V f denote the expected discounted utility to a Home agent holding his production good, the Home currency, and Foreign currency, respectively. Let P ab (P ab ) denote the transition probability with which a Home (Foreign) agent switches his inventory from object 7 One may like to assume that Home government and Foreign government have di¤erent e¢ ciency in providing public goods; e.g., the quantity of public goods G is a fraction of total consumption goods purchased by the government, and both countries may have di¤erent 's. One can also assume that Home and Foreign agents have di¤erent preferences for public goods.
a to object b: Then, the Bellman's equations are
Note that the …rst terms in the RHS of equality in (2) and (3) imply that, if an agent's currency is con…scated by the issuing government (with probability h and f that his money is con…scated by Home and Foreign government, respectively), his value becomes that of holding production good. The value functions and strategies must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
For example, V g > V f is the su¢ cient and necessary condition for a Home agent not to trade his production good for Foreign currency.
We restrict our attention to the equilibrium where agents always accept their local currency.
There are thus four types of equilibria -no international currency, Foreign currency is the only international currency, Home currency is the only international currency, and both currencies circulate in both countries. We characterize the existence conditions in terms of and n; the extent of international and local trade frictions, as well as the tax rates h and f .
First of all, in any of these equilibria, we have P f h = P hf = P f h = P hf = 0. Given the tiebreaking rule, no two agents in the same country exchange Home currency and Foreign currency;
indeed, for currency exchange to occur between two, say, Home agents, we need s hf = s f h = 1, which implies V f > V h and V h > V f : a contradiction. Therefore, the only possibility for currency exchange is between agents from di¤erent countries. Due to the nature of equilibrium, this may happen only when both currencies circulate worldwide. In this case, we need to have, say, V h > V f and V f > V h (the opposite case has a similar consequence). If h = f holds, then the two currencies are perfect substitutes, and therefore, Before conducting equilibrium analysis, we calculate the value functions from (1), (2) and (3):
where
Using the above value functions, we are able to state some general results.
Proposition 2.1. In a steady-state equilibrium,
The same relations hold for a Foreign agent, with relevant variables starred.
Equilibria 3.1 Equilibrium A: Two local currencies
In this equilibrium a Home agent trades his production good for the Home currency, the Home currency for his consumption good, but does not accept Foreign currency
A Foreign agent trades his production good for the Foreign currency, the Foreign currency for his consumption good, but does not accept the Home currency (u
There is no international currency and no international trade in this equilibrium. The inventory distributions are given by X = (1 m; m; 0) and X = (1 m ; 0; m ): The transition probabilities in this equilibrium for a Home agent are:
Note that P gh incorporates the opportunity to sell goods to acquire money from private agents and Home government with probabilities nm(1 h )=k and nm h =k; respectively. If a Home agent ever holds Foreign currency, then given others'strategies the chance that he can acquire consumption goods is from trading with Foreign sellers, of which probability is (1
Similarly, the transition probabilities for a Foreign agent are:
To …nd the existence conditions for Equilibrium A, we verify the incentive constraints
other inequalities. We have V g V f (Home agents do not accept Foreign currency) i¤ A ; where
Likewise, Foreign agents do not accept Home currency, or V g V h , i¤ A ; where
In the sequel, we focus on the case where agents are su¢ ciently patient relative to matching frequency, i.e., we study the limiting situation where goes to zero. Taking the limit, we obtain
Given parameter values of m; m ; k; h ; and f ; A , A give the existence conditions of equilibrium A on (n; ) space, shown in Figure 1 . 8 The region of existence of Equilibrium A on (n; )-space depends on the ratio (1
the less is
A and the greater is A . In other words, as h increases and/or f decreases, the locus = A shifts downward, while the locus = A shifts upward (see Figure 1) . If we interpret ( h ; f ) as a proxy for the rate of in ‡ation, then this change is intuitive. The less (1
is, the less attractive Home currency becomes relative to Foreign currency, and therefore, the less (resp. more) incentive agents have to use Home currency (resp. Foreign currency). The downward shift of A implies that under an in ‡ationary policy, staying autarchy is not the best response unless the population size of the country is big enough to o¤set the negative impacts due to the risk of con…scating currency. Thus, for a given pair of (n; ); if a country adopts too high an in ‡ation tax rate, it may destroy the equilibrium with two currency areas.
Equilibria F and H: one local currency and one international currency
We discuss the existence conditions for Equilibrium F, where Home currency is accepted only in Home country, while Foreign currency circulates in both Home and Foreign country as an international medium of exchange. Equilibrium H is the mirror image of Equilibrium F and can be characterized in a similar manner.
When agents follow these strategies, m h = m and so X = (1 m m f ; m; m f ) and X =
(1 m f ; 0; m f ): The steady state requires that the ratios of commodity holders to the Foreign currency holders in the two countries be equalized, i.e., The total supply of Foreign currency must equal the total amount circulates in both countries
The transition probabilities for a Home agent are
where B = n(1 m) + (1 n), and for a Foreign agent
where B = n(1 m) + (1 n), and m f satis…es (11).
From Proposition 2.1, it su¢ ces to check that Home agents accept Home currency (V g < V h ),
and that Foreign agents do not accept Home currency
First, substituting (12) into the third and forth claims of Proposition 2.1, and taking the limit of going to zero, we have
and
Equilibrium F exists if and only if the two incentive constraints hold, given (11), (12) and (13).
We depict the equilibrium region de…ned by (14) and (15) on the space of (n; ) in Figure 2 .
Given other parameters, an increase in h leads to a decrease in F , while an increase in f leads to an increase in F . Likewise, an increase in h leads to an increase in F , while an increase in f leads to a decrease in F : Hence, the higher the Home in ‡ation tax is (or similarly, the lower Foreign in ‡ation tax is), the less likely Home and Foreign agents are to use Home currency.
Equilibrium U: two international currencies
In this equilibrium, both currencies circulate side by side, i.e., they are both universally accepted:
agents follow these strategies, X = X ; and m h = m h = nm; and m f = m f = (1 n)m : The transition probabilities are
Given any h > 0 and f > 0; and taking the limit of going to zero,
Combining (17) and (18), we ensure that the existence of equilibrium U i¤
If the tax rate of, say, Home currency is su¢ ciently high in comparison with that of Foreign currency, then agents start rejecting Home currency, and the more Foreign currency balance we have, the lower this threshold is since each agent can have Foreign currency relatively quickly after he rejects Home currency.
This result is in contrast to Matsuyama et al. (1993) in which the equilibrium with both currencies universally accepted exists for all parameter values. The reason for this di¤erence is that currencies are no longer perfect substitutes even in this equilibrium if the tax rates are di¤erent. Indeed, if h = f holds, then the two currencies become perfect substitutes, and such an equilibrium exists under all parameter values.
Policies and Welfare
The following two sections discuss currency competition between governments and its e¤ects on welfare and the determination of currency regimes.
The welfare of Home country (resp. Foreign country), denoted by W (resp. W ), consists of the long-run expected (average) value of each agent in Home (resp. Foreign) country from private transactions and the payo¤ stream of the representative Home (resp. Foreign) agent obtained from public goods. To be concrete, we use the following speci…cations:
where G = (m h P hg + m h P hg ) h and G = (m f P f g + m f P f g ) f are the total amounts of public goods, measured by private goods, in each period provided by Home and Foreign governments, respectively. Using these values as the payo¤s of the respective governments, we analyze a situation where the two countries use the tax rates and, in some case, money balances as policy instruments. We …rst study each type of equilibrium separately, and then consider a regime change from one type of equilibrium to another, e.g., equilibrium A to F.
In the subsequent analysis, we sometimes use
to obtain a closed form solution. Note that by letting su¢ ciently large, we can approximate the situation with seigniorage maximizing governments, and therefore, we do not study such a situation separately.
Equilibrium A
Consider an interior solution to the policy game where all the agents as well as governments believe Equilibrium A to prevail. Substituting transition probabilities (7) into (19), and di¤er-entiating it with respect to m, we obtain
Therefore, the optimal money balance is m A = 1=2. Similarly, we have m A = 1=2 for Foreign money balance where the superscript \A" stands for Equilibrium A. Di¤erentiating (19) with respect to h , we obtain
Similarly, we have
If we use the speci…cation (21), then (23) is rewritten as:
In a similar manner, the optimal tax rate for Foreign government is given by:
Substituting m A = m A = 1=2 into the above solutions, we …nally obtain
Note that this solution exists if and only if 4k < u, which we assume hereafter.
Equilibrium F
We conduct an analysis similar to the previous subsection, albeit more complicated than that.
We assume that the governments believe Equilibrium F to prevail. Also, to simplify the illustration in this subsection, we assume that n < 1=2 holds.
First of all, if we di¤erentiate W with respect to m f after substituting (13) into (20), we
which implies m f = 1=2. Therefore, the optimal money balance for Foreign country is given by m f = 1=2. On the other hand, the optimal balance of Home currency is not independent of other variables and parameters. In the sequel, we let m f = 1=2 and m = m as given and examine the policy game where h and f are chosen simultaneously. 9
Foreign country's problem is straightforward, which is to choose f to maximize W . Differentiating W with respect to f , we obtain
Using (21), we have (1 n) < (1 m)B + B . This inequality implies that the tax base for Foreign currency is larger in Equilibrium F than in Equilibrium A, which enables the government to adopt a lower optimal in ‡ation tax. On the other hand, the right hand side of (24) is greater than that of (27). This corresponds to the extent to which Foreign government can raise revenue from Home agents, which gives it an incentive to raise the in ‡ation tax. 10 Under the current speci…cation, however, the e¤ect of an increased tax base dominates that of collecting seigniorage from Home agents. 9 We may consider a two stage game where m f and m are chosen …rst and h and f are chosen second. One can think of m as a solution to such a problem, though we do not explicitly solve for m: Although it would be nice to obtain a closed form solution for m, it is su¢ cient even without it for the present purpose, which is to make a qualitative comparison between various tax rates. 1 0 The right hand side of (27) represents the relative utility sacri…ce from private consumption of foreign agents due to the in ‡ation tax. This ratio is less than 1 in equilibrium F because the tax burden falls partially on Home agents, and this creates incentive to adopt a higher tax rate.
Home country is faced with the constraint that its currency has to be accepted by Home agents, i.e., F . Thus, its problem is given by
where F and W come from (14) and (19) together with (12). Solving this problem in the standard fashion, we obtain
is the degree of "openness" of Home country, and
If the degree of "openness" is not too high, or < , Home country can freely choose its tax rate, or to be precise, = F is not binding. In this case, since m(1 m) 1=4 holds, we have
In other words, the country with local currency has an incentive to raise its tax rate to collect seigniorage due to the internationalization of Foreign currency. If the degree of integration proceeds further, or 2 ( ; ), then = F becomes binding: an in ‡ation discipline is needed in order to keep Home currency in circulation. Beyond , equilibrium F no longer exists since even if Home government sets h = 0, Home agents have no incentive to accept Home currency. 11 1 1 Note that while < and > 0 always hold, can be negative. If this is the case, (30) is reduced to 
Equilibrium U
The analysis of this equilibrium is easier than that of equilibrium F. Indeed, it is veri…ed that at the optimum, we have
provided that (31) (resp. (32)) satis…es (17) (resp. (18)); for if not, Home (resp. Foreign) currency would not be accepted by anyone. Therefore, if (17) is violated, it is Home government that lowers the in ‡ation rate to meet the constraint, i.e.,
where U f is given by (32). Similarly, if (18) is violated, then we have
where U h is given by (31). In order to compare them with the corresponding rates in equilibria A and F, we let m = m = 1=2. 12 Then it is veri…ed that U h > A h and U f > A f hold. 13 Both countries have incentives to increase the tax rates to collect seigniorage from the other country. One can also verify that @ U h =@ < 0 and @ U f =@ < 0; i.e., as the degree of "openness"increases, the optimal 1 2 It is veri…ed that @W=@m > 0 at m = m = 1=2. We assume that in equilibrium U, m and m are not policy variables, but historically determined ones. This enables us to compare equilibrium U with equilibrium A with respect to in ‡ation rate rather than the amount of money, which has an unrealistic crowding out e¤ect in the present model. 1 3 Equations (31) and (32) are equivalent to
Also, we verify that (33) and (34) are greater than 4k =u where we make use of 4k =u < 1:
tax rate under equilibrium U decreases. If n < 1=2, then we have U f < U h ; i.e., the government of the larger country imposes a lower in ‡ation rate than that of the smaller country.
Welfare comparisons
This subsection compares equilibria A, F, and U in terms of welfare. Let us compare equilibria A and F …rst. To begin with, (20) implies that W is larger in equilibrium F than in equilibrium A. This is fairly intuitive since both the trade opportunity and the tax base are larger in the former than in the latter.
On the other hand, the direction of change in W is unclear since we have the positive e¤ect of an increase in trade opportunity and the negative e¤ect of losing the tax base. These e¤ects change as the "openness" of Home country changes.
Suppose that , or , is close to zero. We evaluate W and W at m A = m F f = 1=2 and m F = m; = 0 and substitute the optimal 's into the expressions to obtain
One can show that
Thus, if the "openness" is su¢ ciently low, then equilibrium A is preferred to equilibrium F by Home country. The reason is that the seigniorage is partially taken away by Foreign government, while there is little bene…t from trade.
If the "openness" of Home country increases, this may not be the case. To see this, we evaluate W A and W F at = A n=2(1 n). Its sign is ambiguous; we have numerical examples of both cases, W F W A > 0 and W F W A < 0, as shown in Table 1 .
Next, we study equilibrium U in comparison with other equilibria. We have
If is close to zero, there is no gain from trade and so the signs of W U W A and W U W A depend upon the relative country size:
In other words, the smaller the country size is, the more likely it is to gain by the global circulation of both currencies. The reason is simple: if the country size is small, it can obtain huge seigniorage from abroad provided that it succeeds in circulating its own currency, the di¢ culty of which is, of course, a di¤erent question.
If the country sizes are not too uneven, or to be precise, if 1=e < n < 1 1=e holds, then both countries lose due to a switch from equilibrium A to equilibrium U. The situation exhibits the one similar to the prisoner's dilemma, i.e., W U W A j =0 < 0 and W U W A j =0 < 0.
The sign of W U W F j =0 is ambiguous but one can show that it is positive as long as u is su¢ ciently large. Since we know W F W A j =0 > 0 and W U W F j =0 > 0 i¤ n < (1 1=e)=(2 m m 2 ); in the neighborhood of = 0, we have
if n < 1=e,
if 1=e < n < 1 1=e, Table 1 : equilibria A, F, U if = A if 1 1=e < n < (1 1=e)=(2 m m 2 ) and
If is relatively large, we do not have such a clear relationship since we now have another e¤ect, gains from trade. 14 In order to compare welfare across equilibria, we assume that = A , which is the greatest for which equilibrium A exists. In this case, we have some numerical examples shown in Table 1 .
International policy coordination
This subsection studies international policy coordination by letting governments jointly choose a policy that maximizes the joint welfare W + W :
Equilibrium A
In this equilibrium, policy instruments do not a¤ect the other country, and therefore, the
is the same as the one in the non-cooperative game, i.e., (
Equilibrium F
The optimal balances of currencies depend on other parameters. To simplify the analysis, we let m = m and m f = m f as given. The problem becomes:
We di¤erentiate W + W with respect to f and …nd
which is smaller than the non-cooperative solution,
Maximizing the joint welfare, Foreign government takes into account its e¤ects on the other country, which, in this case, lowers the tax rate to reduce the tax burden on Home agents.
On the other hand, since W does not depend on h ; the solution^ h to (35) is the same as in the non-cooperative game; i.e.,
where (1 n) n :
Equilibrium U
We consider the following problem:
subject to the constraints for existence. We have the following internal solution:
and m = m = 1=2: Notice that^ Letting m = m = 1=2 for equilibria A and U and m = m and m f = 1=2 for equilibrium F, we summarize the above results as follows:
In the non-cooperative game the issuing country of an international currency tends to adopt an excessive in ‡ation tax, causing ine¢ ciencies associated with lack of policy coordination. These ine¢ ciencies increase as both countries become more integrated.
The non-cooperative tax rates are shown to be higher than the cooperative outcome (optimum). The di¤erence between this result and the result of undercutting in many other tax competition studies is mainly due to the di¤erence between the standard competitive model and the search-theoretic model. In the search-theoretic model considered here, agents have to hold a certain currency in a particular equilibrium in order to trade. Therefore, a seigniorage collecting government has an incentive to increase its tax rate a little above the tax rate of the other government even if the rate is at the socially optimal level. The reason is that, unlike the competitive model, the government can still have its currency accepted by doing so. The mechanism of gaining by undercutting thus does not work here.
Strategic selection of equilibrium
In the previous sections, we con…ne our attention to the situations in which the governments believe a certain equilibrium to prevail and try to meet the constraint it faces to sustain the equilibrium. This section goes one step further, albeit not technically rigorous, and considers a situation in which the governments choose the tax rates, understanding the possibility that their choices a¤ect the type of equilibrium to prevail. Unlike other sections, this section is illustrative rather than analytical.
We focus on the equilibrium selection between equilibria A and F. For this purpose, assume n < 1=2, and that A holds under h = f = 4k =u. Assume further that m = m = 1=2 if equilibrium A prevails, and that m f = 1=2 and m = m if equilibrium F prevails. We …nally assume that equilibrium A initially prevails. 15 We assume that once Home agents start accepting Foreign currency, this process continues until equilibrium F prevails with the money balances as assumed, and the governments care only about the …nal (stationary) outcome.
Let us …x h = 4k =u for the moment and consider the incentive of Foreign government. In order to have equilibrium F, Foreign government lowers f to make Foreign currency attractive to Home agents. This happens if > A occurs under ( h ; f ) = (4k =u; f ). From (9), the threshold value of f , denoted by f , is given by
There are two questions that are of particular interest. The …rst is whether or not Foreign government raises the tax rate from f after equilibrium F prevails, i.e., whether the time inconsistency problem arises or not. We can examine it by comparing f with F f as given in the previous section. That is, in order to switch to equilibrium F, the Foreign government lowers the in ‡ation rate below the threshold f to make Foreign currency attractive to Home agents. If the threshold f is higher than F f , then by adopting the optimal in ‡ation rate F f , the Foreign government can move the economy to equilibrium F without changing the in ‡ation rate afterwards. Under this situation, the time-inconsistency problem does not arise.
Subtracting (28) from (38), we obtain
By de…nition, = = 0 at = 0, and = 1=2 at = A under h = f . Therefore, we have f < F f if is close to zero since 4k =u < 1, and f > F f if is close to a half. As the degree of "openness"facing Home country is higher, there is larger gains from accepting Foreign currency, and this o¤sets partially the negative e¤ect due to a higher f and thus, allows for a higher threshold f : In other words, the time inconsistency problem is less likely to arise if the degree of "openness" is high. This also implies that, given other parameters, the larger Foreign country is, the more likely it is the case that by choosing the optimal in ‡ation rate it can ensure the existence of its preferred equilibrium without facing the time inconsistency problem.
The second question is whether or not Home government has an incentive to prevent equilibrium F from prevailing by lowering its tax rate as well. To begin with, Home government has to set the rate as low as
for this purpose. As one may see, it depends upon Foreign government's decision.
In order to analyze this situation, we need to specify a scenario or a game. We consider two suggestive, but not necessarily most plausible, scenarios. 16 The …rst scenario is as follows:
Step 1. Home government chooses h . After observing it, Foreign government chooses f .
Step 2-a. If
A holds under ( h ; f ) determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails under ( A h ; A f ) = (4k =u; 4k =u) and m = m = 1=2.
Step 2-b. 
That is, given h ; the larger Foreign country is, the more likely equilibrium F is to prevail.
The second scenario is the one in which
Step 2-a is replaced by the following:
Step 2-a' . If A holds under ( h ; f ) determined in Step 1, then equilibrium A prevails under ( h ; f ) and m = m = 1=2.
In the second scenario, Home government may have to pay an extra cost to maintain equilibrium A. Since Foreign government has an incentive to lower its tax rate as low as zero if doing so leads to equilibrium F, Home government has to set h at 1 2 if it wishes to prevent the regime change. The higher the degree of "openness" is, the larger is the gains from accepting Foreign currency, and therefore, the higher is the cost for Home government to maintain equilibrium A.
Some numerical examples are shown in Table 2 . In this table, cases (1)-(4) induce the same equilibrium, F, in both scenarios. Home government prefers equilibrium F to A. In cases (1) and (2), however, Foreign government cannot attain equilibrium F if Home government chooses A h . Therefore, Home government sets its rate su¢ ciently high so that Foreign government can induce equilibrium F by choosing a su¢ ciently low rate. = 1; n = :2; m = :4 k = 10; u = 1000 k = 6; u = 100 prevent the change. In the second scenario, however, Home government has to commit to a low tax rate to prevent equilibrium F, incurring an extra cost to keep the tax rate that would be nonoptimal had there been no concern for equilibrium selection. Consequently, Home government may no longer wish to maintain equilibrium A. In case (5), it chooses h since W A > W F holds.
However, in cases (6)-(8), since W A < W F holds, Home government does not choose h but some rate higher than that to allow Foreign government to implement equilibrium F.
Conclusion
The issues on currency competition have been discussed in many previous studies, yet there has been few works modeling it in an environment with endogenous determination of the realms of circulation of currencies and strategic interaction between money issuers. By explicitly considering strategic interaction between governments, we have obtained some insights concerning currency competition. For example, the negative impact of a country's in ‡ationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency imposes an in ‡ation discipline: the more open a country is, the stronger is the discipline. This result o¤ers another account for the empirical evidence that the degree of "openness" is negatively correlated with the rate of in ‡ation (Romer, 1993) .
We also …nd that, the issuing country of an international currency has an incentive to choose a lower in ‡ation rate than in autarky, a result that is in sharp contrast with previous studies that show governments would opt for an in ‡ation bias if the tax burden falls partially on foreigners (see, e.g., Canzoneri 1989) . The other country, since the tax base is reduced due to the use of foreign currency, chooses a higher in ‡ation rate. However, there is a limit of the in ‡ation rate beyond which it cannot sustain the circulation of its national currency.
Another implication is on the costs and bene…ts of having two international currencies. Our model suggests that when the degree of integration is su¢ ciently small, if the two countries are of similar size, they both lose by shifting from autarky to the equilibrium with universally circulating currencies. This result is in contrast to those in the previous studies with twocountry two-currency search-theoretic models, which argue that a uni…ed currency regime is always preferred. The di¤erence lies in the fact that the current model takes into account a negative e¤ect caused by competition on seigniorage collection. Policy coordination through, say, monetary union, can internalize this negative e¤ect.
Despite the recent development of search theoretic models that relax restrictions on individuals'money holdings and indivisibility of money, 18 we choose to work with a simple model as it is su¢ cient for the present purpose. Using a large household model of divisible money, Head and Shi (2003) study the e¤ects of in ‡ation on the exchange rate, but they do not consider various currency regimes and interaction between governments. Later, Liu and Shi (2006) discuss the strategic interaction and coordination between governments in setting the long-run in ‡ation rate. The simple structure of the current paper allows us to depict the coexistence of an international currency and a local currency -a prevalent phenomenon that is hard to capture in models with divisibility of money and goods, 19 and to discuss various policies. For example, we study the e¤ects of the strategic interaction between governments on the circulation of currencies, and how the possibility of abandoning the use of a currency may impose an in ‡ation discipline on its issuer.
One can study many other issues in the present framework with some modi…cations and extensions. First, we may be able to address issues on trade as well as monetary issues in a uni…ed framework. In the present model, the incentive to trade with foreigners is simply created by expanded trade opportunities. If we consider international trade based on the comparative advantage, some results may still be carried over. For example, if the gains from trade are not too large, then a trade liberalization policy may decrease welfare of the country that starts using foreign currency.
Next, the equilibrium with two local currencies entails no international trade, which is not the case in reality. Zhou (1997) introduces preference shocks to Matsuyama et al. (1993) to induce currency exchange between agents so that they engage in international trade, while both currencies remain local. Another possibility is to introduce a currency exchange market. One way is to endogenize the matching process so that people can go to the market whenever they wish to exchange their money. One can also consider pro…t-maximizing …nancial intermediaries or central banks to exchange currencies with other agents.
Finally, introducing more than two currencies in the present model may help us to address issues on currency zoning. Some countries such as Turkey that has been using dollar face a new alternative of Euro, and it is not clear which currency they end up using. It is interesting to know whether or not the circulation of two international currencies increases welfare, and the implications on the policies of the governments whose currencies circulate only locally and of the governments issuing international currencies.
